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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES.

STATES-ACTIONS-WHAT

ARE

SUITS AGAINST

THE

STATE.The

question of the liability of States for the negligent acts of their
agents has been raised in numerous recent cases.I The courts have
almost unanimously adhered to the ancient doctrine, that, "it is
better for an individual to suffer than for the state to be inconvenienced," and have denied recovery. These cases often occasion serious hardships. Does the result accord with American
principles? According to our theory, governments are instituted
among men for the benefit of the governed. The bill of rights insures a remedy for every wrongful injury.2 It is not contradictory, then, to say that, when the agents of the state negligently inflict an injury upon one of its subjects, such injured
person is denied the benefit of legal process to secure compensation
for his loss? 3 The State has an interest in having its individual
subjects compensated, so far as is practicable, for injuries caused
by the wrongful acts of others. Society has an interest in the
welfare of its members, which interest is better secured by giving
a remedy for damages negligently inflicted upon them. The injured party has an interest in securing compensation for the
injury which he has received. 4 Does the interest of the state in
not being subject to suits outweigh these various interests which
must be sacrificed. by the application of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from suits? Would it not be wise to limit the doctrine
in its application?5 The modern tendency is toward governmental
ownership of many industries, which have been conducted in the
past by private individuals. Municipal corporations engage in
extensive commercial enterprises. Convict labor is employed in
I

Barber v. Spencer State Hospital, 121 S. E. 497, (W. Va. 1924).
Article III, Section 17, Constitution of West Virginia.
In Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio State 158, 126 N. E. 72 (1919)
Johnson in delivering the opinion of the court said: "To adhere to the ancient
rule in the presence of existing relations would seem to involve the obvious
contradiction that the state which is formed to protect society, is under no obligation,
'when acting itself, to protect an individual member of society.
Such conceptions
of sovereign prerogative are not only illogical, but they offend the spirit of our
institutions. We have successfully striven, under a system of checks and balances,
to reconcile liberty with authority. Authority should be reconciled with justice."
See note to this case in 9 A. L. R. 143, also 5 Cornell L. Q. 90-93.
* See RoscoE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COiMON LAiv, 91-93.
e Some cases allow recovery for all negligent acts of the agents of municipal
corporations. Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 94 So. 697 (Fla. 1922).
6 Wigal v. City of Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 28 (1914), 81 S. E. 554.
- See
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penal institutions for profit; and farms are often conducted in
connection with state charitable institutions. 8 With this growing
tendency we shall expect an increasing number of injuries to go
without redress, unless the doctrine of non-suability of states is
reasonably limited.
The question was before the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia in a recent case in which it appeared that the
plaintiff's intestate received injuries, from which he died, while
operating a tractor on a state farm. The injury was caused by
the negligence of the overseers of the State Hospital in not keeping
the tractor in proper repair. The State Hospital was made defendent in an action for the wrongful death of the intestate. Held,
the action is not maintainable since it is in effect a suit against the
state.' Here is unquestionably a case of hardship. The negligent
acts of the agents of the defendant have caused the plaintiff injury
for which the law affords no relief, because of the survival of the
ancient doctrine that "the King can do no wrong.' 10 If the Court
holds as in the principal case, that this is in effect a suit against
the state, the suit is barred by Article IV, Section 35 of the Constitution of West Virginia which reads: "The State of West
Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court of law or
equity."-" Would not a liberal construction of this constitutional
provision permit suits against the agents of the State to recover
for injuries inflicted in carrying on enterprises not governmental
2
in their nature, and thus avoid hardships ?1
In Thompkins v. The Kanawha Board 19 W. Va. 257 the property of the defendant corporation belonged to the state and the
corporation was engaged in dredging the Kanawha river for the
benefit of the state. Recovery was allowed against the board for
loss caused by the negligence of the agents of the Board. Is there
a distinction between that case and the principal case? Chapter
15-M, Section 1, Code, 1923 makes the Board of Control a Corpo7 State ex rel Gordon v. State Board of Control, 85 W. Va. 739, 102 S. E. 688
(1920).
s Barber v. Spencer State Hospital, Supra.
Idem.
'0 Muller Supply Co. v. State Board of Control, 72 W. Va. 524, 78 S. E. 672
(1913).
For a discussion of the non-suability of states generally see the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell in Chisholm V. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419 (U. S. 1793)
beginning at 429. See also John Al. Maguire, "State Liability for Tort," 30, HAay.
L. R. 20, CHApix ON ToRTS, 196-197.
Workmen's Compensation Act expressly excepts the state of West Virginia
from the operation of the section which imposes absolute liability on employers
who do not elect to pay the premiums provided by the act, or are in default of
such payment. Chapter 15-P Section 26, Code 1923.
22 See the dissenting opinion of Wanamaker, J. in Aldrich v. City of Youngstown,
106 Ohio State 342, 140 N. E. 164. In which the majority of the court overruled
Fowler v. City of Cleveland aupra, note 3.
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ration, Section 5 of the same chapter vests the title to the property
of state institutions in that Board. The decision of the court
in the principal case rested upon the assumption that the suit was
properly brought against the State Board of Control. Is it going
too far to say that the State Board of Control is an entity apart
from the state and subject to suit in those cases where its agents
wrongfully inflict injuries upon others in the performance of
non-governmental duties?
-E. L. D.

SPEcIc PERFORmANE-FAIR AND EQUITABLE CONTRACTS.-P took

an option from D for a lot 60 feet deep, P indicating that he was
purchasing for the city. Evidence was conflicting as to whether
D made the contract with the understanding that she did not
mean to convey any part of two houses situated on the rear of the
lot. A lot of the depth agreed upon would include a part of the
houses. P sought to enforce the contract as an individual. Held,
specific performance refused. Hastings v. Montgomery, 122 S. E.
155 (W. Va. 1924).
The court said that to entitle one to a decree for specific performance, the contract must be "free from fraud and mistake, and
fair and equitable in its terms." There are many instances in
which, though no actual fraud exists, there is a want of that equality and fairness which may be said to be essential for specific
performances. FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 6TH ED. 185; STORY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 1026, 1034, 1037; POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUNDECE, 2 D ED. 785.
The statement that the contract must
be fair is one which is common in many cases, but the definition of
the word, or a correct understanding of what unfairness is necessary to refuse specific performance, is not always clear. Conceding
the contract to be valid, should a court of equity, under all the
circumstances, specifically enforce the contract? If the enforcement
of the contract would impose a burden "utterly disproportionate to
the benefit secured to the plaintiff," the contract is unfair, and
specific performance will be refused. City of London v. Nash,
3 Atk. 512; Kimberly v. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340; Clark v. Rochester
L. and N. F. RR. Co., 18 Barb. 350 (N. Y. 1854). See also Conger v.
New York W. S. and B. R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 29, 23 N. E. 983. The
's Cf. Sargent County v. State, doing business as the Bank of North Dakota 47
N. D. 561, 182 N. W. 270. See note to this case In 35 HAaV. L. R. 335.
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